

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200040014-7

*This is yellow copy*  
*Courier # M-292908*  
*mailed 3/18/71*

16 March 1971

Mr. Ollon D. McCool  
Chief, Office Management Division  
Office of the Adjutant General  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20315

Dear Mr. McCool:

The attached documents received with your request AGAR-S (70507) dated 21 December 1970 have been reviewed.

This Agency has no objection to the declassification of the information contained in the documents numbered 13, 14, and 15 for release to Mr. Larry I. Bland. In the document numbered 16 we take exception to the penultimate paragraph, near the bottom of the page, specifically,

[REDACTED]

We feel that this paragraph should not be declassified or released. We recommend that it be referred to the Department of State for evaluation as it involves an issue in the realm of the political.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

CIA Records Administration Officer

DDS/SSS/RAB, [REDACTED] d (16 Mar. 71)

Enclosures:

4 pages of notes by Bland

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

STATINT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		NOTICE TO RECIPIENT		COURIER REC. NO.	DATE SENT
DOCUMENT RECEIPT		Sign and Return as Shown on Reverse Side		M 202008	18 Mar. 71
SENDER OF DOCUMENT(S)		ROOM	BLDG.	DATE DOCUMENT(S) SENT	
[REDACTED]		702	Magazine	18 March 1971	
DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT(S) SENT					
CIA NO.	DOCUMENT DATE	COPIES	DOCUMENT TITLE	ATTACHMENTS	CLASS
	16 Mar. 71	1	AGAR-S (70507)	4 pages of notes by Bland	
RECIPIENT					
ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT			SIGNATURE (ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S))		
Mr. Ollon D. McCool Office of the Adjutant Gen. Rm. 2E-532 Pentagon			<i>Paul L. Tabor</i>		
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200040014-7			OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GEN. DATE OF RECEIPT		
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200040014-7			18 MAR 1971		

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**TO: CIA RECIPIENT**

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WASHINGTON 25, D.C. Stop 64

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12 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

STATINTL  
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I phoned [REDACTED] concerning his memo of 9 March 1971 regarding AGAR-S (70507) on declassification of OSS notes taken by Mr. Bland.

[REDACTED] told me that the DDP did not write any notes or comments but the CI Staff said he was very emphatic that the last paragraph of page 16 not be declassified.

The comment from DDP per CI said: "Declassification and release of the slip item (noted in SSU memo 9 March) at the bottom of page 16 is against the best interests of the United States because the Soviets, if they get it -- and they surely will when Mr. Bland publishes it, would have a field day with it."

John and I discussed the Agency position in withholding declassification. He explained that since these were Army records, the Agency had no strong way it could officially compel its continued classification, if Army did not agree. I suggested that the information involved in the record was political rather military or intelligence and therefore the Department of State may be very interested in preventing its release.

John and I agreed that the Adjutant General should be advised of the Agency's reservation on the declassification and recommendation that the question was in the realm of the political and should be coordinated with Department of State for their evaluation.

[REDACTED]  
CIA Records Administration Officer

STATINTL

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5 January 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: Director of Strategic Services Unit

SUBJECT : Review and Declassification of OSS Documents

The Adjutant General's Office proposes to declassify the attached notes taken by Mr. Larry I. Bland from OSS originated documents if there are no objections from this agency. May I have your comments, please.

  
CIA Records Administration Officer

Attachments:

AGO memo AGAR-S 70507  
4 pages of notes

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee  
1 - OSS File  
1 - RAB Suspense  
1 - RAB Chrono

DDS/SSS/RAB/  d (5 Jan. 71)

25X1A

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25X1A

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

9 March 1971


STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: 


SUBJECT : Review and Declassification of OSS Documents

1. Returned herewith are the documents you referred to us some time ago in connection with AGAR-S (70507). The CI Staff felt that one of the documents submitted should be reviewed by the DDP. After his review he took strong exception to declassifying a small part of the document dated 2 April 1945.

STATINTL

  
2. Clearance for the rest of the information contained in the documents submitted is authorized.

STATINTL

  
Executive Secretary  
Strategic Services Unit

Attachments, A/S

12 March 1971

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CIA Records Administration Officer

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
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25X1A



CIA Records Administration Officer

Attachments:

AGO memo AGAR-S 70507

4 pages of notes

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AGAR-S (70507)

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

21 DEC 1970

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Records Administration Officer  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Mr. Larry I. Bland, an unofficial researcher authorized access to classified Army files, has taken a number of notes related to his study on the diplomatic career of W. A. Harriman. Among these are four pages of notes taken from OSS-originated documents and Army documents responding to OSS requests. Copies of these pages are inclosed.

This department has no objection to the declassification of these notes. If there are no objections within your agency, we will declassify the inclosed pages and release them to Mr. Bland.

Your comments are requested.

Sincerely,

Inclosures  
4 pages of notes (C)

*J. S. McCool*  
COLLON D. McCOOL  
Chief, Office Management Division

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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25X1A

Moscow Military Mission

telegram

RG 334, Box 18, File: "OSS."

OSS

31 May 1945

25X1A

Soviet military budget for 1945

WAR-FCP, 83

"At the end April Zverev announced record military budget for 1945. Germany's collapse then imminent. Request your opinion why Russia did not reduce military appropriations for 1945. In view of vast stocks war materials budget seems oversized even in event Russian participation Far Eastern war.

"2. Can you furnish us: (a) any details broken down by large categories of appropriations, (b) information on increase of Naval construction, (c) information whether high military budget due writing off war plants to price increases or is international bluff, (d) kindly forward information as available by cable if you can."

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~~Secret~~

Moscow Military Mission

25X1A

telegram

RG 334, Box 18, File: "OSS."

6 June 1945

25X1A

Subject: Soviet military budget for 1945  
(cf. WAR-90893 31 May 1945)

Planned Sov. military budget for 1944 was 128.4 billion Rubles, actual expenditure was 137.9 billion; planned for 1945 is 137.9 billion. Military expenditures 52.5% of 1944 budget, 1945 is only 45% planned total budget.

Large scale construction of seaports announced but no large-scale construction of ships announced.

No announcement or other indications of large-scale conversion of plants to consumer goods. Indications of continuation of output of tanks, locomotives, steel and other basic materials at war-time levels.

Mobilization ordered for summer training of all boys in 8th-10th grades. Soviets will probably keep large army because they are extravagant in use of guards and have large area to guard.

1945 budget figures drawn up before hostilities ended and may just be arbitrary with idea of later adjustment.

Continuation of weapon manuf. to bring total army and reserve into proper proportion.

Other possible explanations for continued large military budget examined--some evidence to support each.

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~~Secret~~

25X1A Moscow Military Mission

memorandum

RG 334, Box 18, File: "OSS."

2 April 1945

"Problems and Objectives of United States Policy"

25X1A

25X1A Prepared by OSS for [redacted] Donovan has it sent to [redacted] 16 May 1945; WAH also sees [redacted] 25X1A

1. US-UK-USSR etc. join to check expansion of Germany and Japan and to prevent them from dominating their respective continents.

"Once these objectives have been attained, the United States will be confronted with a situation potentially more dangerous than any preceding one. Russia will emerge from the present conflict as by far the strongest nation in Europe and Asia--strong enough, if the United States should stand aside, to dominate Europe and at the same time to establish her hegemony over Asia. Russia's natural resources and manpower are so great that within relatively few years she can be much more powerful than either Germany or Japan has ever been. In the easily foreseeable future Russia may well outrank even the United States in military potential.

"The aims and intentions of Soviet Russia cannot be predicted with any certainty. For one thing, history and ideology may easily lead Russia to interpret as aggressive the most pacific security measures of the other powers, and then herself to embark upon "preventive" aggression. If Russia is offered the most elaborate guarantees, with the creation of organs for their enforcement, she may content herself with a sphere of control in Eastern Europe and in the northern borderlands of China, and with an influence roughly equal to that of the Western Powers in Germany, China and Japan, and may choose to devote herself to internal development and improvement of the living standard.

~~"The aims and intentions of Soviet Russia cannot be predicted with any certainty. For one thing, history and ideology may easily lead Russia to interpret as~~  
In that case she need not be a threat either to other European states or to the United States. On the other hand, she may revert to the predatory tradition of Tsarist days or to the dynamism of the Communist International and may pursue a policy of expansion aimed at bringing all Europe and perhaps Asia under her control. If she should succeed in such a policy she would become a menace more formidable to the United States than any yet known. Russia's social and political system makes possible a singleness of purpose and direction, as well as an integration of power, such as no non-totalitarian nation like the United States can hope to attain. At present the decision rests largely with one man--a man who knows nothing of foreign countries from personal experience. Even though he should turn out to be the soul of moderation, nothing can be said of his successor and no guarantee can be had that Russia will not produce a new military conqueror."

"Obviously, nothing is to be gained from unreasoning antagonism to Russia...."

"It must rather be our aim to convince Russia of our own unaggressive intentions and of our readiness to understand and consider her problems while at the same time demonstrating our determination to safeguard our own interests."

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*No indication of who wrote this*

~~SECRET~~

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US should do everything possible to promote est. and operation of system of world security. Especially important is cooperation of US-UK-USSR. Above presupposes Soviet desire for peace and readiness for reasonable compromise; if this not the case US must prepare for possible future war.

"The great and compelling fact in the situation is Russia's future war potential and the tremendous threat to the United States if Russia should succeed in uniting the resources of Europe and Asia under her sway. Within a generation Russia could probably then outbuild us in every phase of military production. The present war has shown conclusively that with airpower and ships, a great power can move huge masses of men and supplies over vast ocean distances, despite the existence of strong enemy bases enroute, and the opposition of strong enemy forces of ships, submarines, and planes. This is the crux of the whole problem, and it dictates the urgent necessity of taking all measures to prevent or delay the domination of Europe and/or Asia by a power already so formidable as Russia."

"Unfortunately, recent events indicate that the Soviet Government puts but little store by proposals of compromise or by international agreements." ~~Russian armies~~ Soviets clearly want to dominate governments of East Europe.

"If Russia were to establish a Communist regime in Germany or in any way to attain domination over that country, then her dominance over the Continent would be already assured and the future of Britain as well as France and eventually of the United States would be gravely jeopardized."

US will emerge stronger from war than Russia, but with smaller population. Soviets will probably want to avoid major conflict for 10-15 years. US needs "...a clear, firm, and thoroughly non-provocative policy...setting limits to Russian domination...building, in Western and Central Europe, a system that may check, rather than stimulate, the spread of Russian influence and control." "Only if the strong position of Russia in Eastern Europe can be counterbalanced by a Western-European-Mediterranean-American bloc will there be much prospect of preventing Russian domination of the whole continent."



25X6

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~~SECRET~~